Introduction
The Chinese autonomous region of Tibet is an area of great economic and geo-strategic significance as it holds considerable amounts of natural resources and connects China to South and Central Asia. In addition, Tibet is known as 'Asia's water tower' since important rivers such as the Mekong, Yangtze and Yellow river originate in the region. Tibet's political status represents a long-run cause of conflict both in China and in international relations that revolve around the question of whether the incorporation of Tibet into China was in accordance with international law. 4 China considers the status of Tibet as an internal affair, in which outside interference is rejected. As Goldstein (1998) notes, international opinion plays an important role in conflicts over regional independence since "the ambiguity about when entities have the right to seek self-determination has made international opinion an important dimension of such disputes" (p. 83). In light of this, the Chinese administration has recognized that its position on Tibet's status not only needs to be enforced domestically, but also internationally.
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Within this context, the Dalai Lama, in his position as leader of the Tibetan community, is seen as a threat to the integrity of the Chinese nation. Consequently, meetings of foreign officials with the Dalai Lama are a constant source of bilateral diplomatic tensions with China.
In addition to purely diplomatic threats, China more-or-less openly threatens that it will respond to meetings between its trading partners' officials and the Tibetan leader with measures that will result in a deterioration of their trade relationships. An article published in
China Daily -a state-run newspaper, known as a mouthpiece of the Communist partyclearly advises against outside interference in the Tibet question "if they [countries] want to By opposing any notion from abroad that might challenge the status-quo of the region, China not only aims to contain the spread of unrest inside Tibet, but also seeks to weaken the worldwide Tibetan independence movement. The role of political determinants of trade is currently in the focus of the literature (e.g, Aidt and Gassebner 2010 , Gassebner, Keck and Teh 2010 , Kastner 2007 , Méon and Sekkat 2008 , Nitsch and Schumacher 2004 . Previous research has shown that the bilateral political climate plays an important role in trade relationships (e.g., Pollins 1989, Morrow, Siverson and Taberes 1998) . Also, diplomatic exchanges between trading partners foster bilateral trade through diplomatic representations (Rose 2007 ) and state visits (Nitsch 2007) . The state of political relations between China and its trading partners is likely to be even more important as a determinant of bilateral trade than it is in the case of trade between free market economies. Whilst prices and other product characteristics should -at least in theory -be the sole determinants of import decisions in a market system, the Chinese government exerts additional influence on commercial activity. In this regard, Aidt and Gassebner (2010) show theoretically and empirically that a country's involvement in international trade differs between democracies and autocracies. Since China is neither a democracy, nor a free market economy, its administration has greater capacity to impact on trading decisions than the government in a democratic free market economy. Such significant scope for government intervention thus gives leeway for the utilization of trade flows as foreign policy tool. Since a country's policy towards the Dalai Lama influences its bilateral relations with China and may provoke retaliatory responses from Beijing, we hypothesize that a trade-deteriorating effect is caused by foreign officials receiving the Dalai Lama.
Beyond existing anecdotal evidence, no empirical analysis has, to the best of our knowledge, thus far been conducted to unveil whether China responds to meetings between its trading partners and the Dalai Lama with any systematic economic punishment.
This paper aims to fill this gap. Moreover, results may offer valuable insights to which extent political relations matter for trade with (autocratic) emerging economies.
We run a gravity model of exports to China from 159 partner countries between 1991 and The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview on the literature regarding the link between bilateral political relations and international trade to get insights how meetings with the Dalai Lama might adversely affect trading relationships. In Section 3, we present anecdotal evidence illustrating how the bilateral climate between China and its trading partners deteriorates after foreign officials' meetings with the Tibetan leader and formulate our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the empirical approach, the data used and the empirical results, which show whether countries officially receiving the Dalai Lama are economically punished through trade reductions. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes.
Political influences on trade and the 'Dalai Lama Effect'
While pure economic theory suggests that economic actors base their trading decisions entirely on intrinsic characteristics of goods and services such as price, quantity and quality, political relations exert additional influence on trade. In this regard, trade ties can be exploited as a foreign policy tool by governments to influence political decisions of trading partners. As such, by manipulating trade flows, a country can exploit the trade dependency of its trading partners in order to force their governments to abide by its political viewpoints.
Bilateral trade flows can thus be used as an instrument of political pressure and leverage against countries with conflicting interests (Hirschman 1945 , Baldwin 1985 . Hereby, the degree of political compliance that can be induced by the dominant country increases with the asymmetry of the trade interdependency between the two trading partners (Keohane and Nye 1977, Richardson and Kegley 1980) . With the rapidly increasing size of the Chinese economy, the asymmetry of trade dependencies between China and its trading partners shifts in China's favor. This development enables China to enforce political compliance among its trading partners to an increasing extent.
Several theoretical concepts provide an explanation why politics matters for bilateral trade relationships. Pollins (1989) has developed a public choice model of bilateral trade flows.
Extending the concept of welfare to include political ties, import decisions are influenced by the place of origin of the traded goods and services, most notably depending on the political relationship between the trading parties. Based on security concerns, risk-averse importers reward political friends and punish adversaries. Regarding hostile relationships between countries, Gowa and Mansfield (1993) (Morrow, Siverson and Taberes 1998, p. 650) . Exploiting bilateral event data on conflict and cooperation for the period 1955 -1978 , Pollins' (1989 empirical results support the hypothesis that greater amity between trading partners increases trade while greater hostility has a trade-reducing effect. Gowa and Mansfield (1993) also find that alliances between trading partners foster bilateral trade. Siverson and Taberes (1998) find that joint democracy and common interests of commercial partners increase bilateral trade between commercial partners whereas no effect is found for conflicts and alliances between countries. In a more recent study, Kastner (2007) Political relations influence bilateral trade with the extent of this influence varying between political regimes "since governments in free market economies still set the rules under which firms import and export, while governments in managed economies directly negotiate the terms of trade" (Morrow, Siverson and Taberes 1998, p. 649) . Thus, the influence of international politics on trading decisions is expected to be of higher importance in autocratic countries such as China than in established market democracies. As trade regulations are stricter and state-owned enterprises are of greater importance for economic activity in most emerging economies, their trading decisions are often more politically driven, turning trade ties into a transaction channel via which the political agenda of a country can be globally disseminated and enforced upon trading partners. In line with this, Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000) discuss regime differences in trade policy that emerge as the chief executive does not rely on the approval of a legislative majority in an autocracy. In a related article, Aidt and Gassebner (2010) show theoretically and empirically that governments of autocracies exert more influence on trade flows than democratic administrations, which is explained by a lack of political accountability faced by the executive of an autocratic regime.
Taken together, in the case of China, the significant scope of government influence in the Chinese economy provides the country's political leaders with all means required to manage trade in such a way that it rewards countries that adhere to China's political preferences and punishes those that do not. Since the Chinese government seeks to contain the expression of opinions that challenge the status quo of Tibet, it reacts with harsh objections to any meeting of foreign officials with the Dalai Lama, the leader of the Tibetan community.
Therefore, a deterioration of the bilateral political climate and a decrease in bilateral diplomatic exchanges, as a result of foreign officials meeting the Dalai Lama, may lead to a systematic reduction of exports to China through government influence. For example, countries receiving the Tibetan leader might be punished directly through a reduction of trade missions and, thus, exports of goods typically purchased in the ambit of such missions. Also, tariff and non-tariff barriers might be raised as a response to receptions of the Dalai Lama by foreign officials.
At first glance, it may seem odd that China would be willing to forgo the gains that would arise from trade under efficient importing decisions in order to punish trading partners who receive the Dalai Lama. However, China's political leadership may be willing to bear the economic and political costs that arise from diverting trade away from Dalai Lama-receiving countries if such 'punishment' increases the likelihood of its political survival. As argued in Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000) , political leaders in autocratic regimes also need to maintain political support to ensure their political survival, which is also reflected in their trade policy. By exerting economic pressure on Dalai Lama-receiving countries, the Chinese administration seeks to maintain the territorial integrity of China and intends to strengthen the stability of its Communist regime in the multi-ethnic country. However, such an economic punishment mechanism will only prevail as long as the expected political gains from stabilizing the regime outweigh the losses from trade diversion.
Furthermore, in addition to direct government action, a trade-deteriorating effect of official Dalai Lama receptions may operate through consumer behavior. Prior empirical research indicates that bilateral opinions (or the affinity between nations) impact on trade as they shift consumer preferences (Disdier and Mayer 2007, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2009 We thus hypothesize that a deterioration of the bilateral political climate and a decrease in bilateral diplomatic exchanges, as a result of foreign officials meeting the Dalai Lama, leads to a significant reduction in exports to China. Our first hypothesis reads as follows: 26 It should be noted that, according to the usual protocol, the president of the German parliament is a higherranking officer than the chancellor. Notwithstanding, the chancellor has significantly more political power and greater public visibility. Following the 'chancellor principle', he or she is responsible for all government policies and issues the formal policy guidelines. 
Hypothesis 3: Evolvement over time
Assuming that the reduction of commercial activity is intended to convey a warning to other trading partners, extensive prolongation of the measure might cause the implied welfare losses to outweigh the political benefits that China attains from increased political compliance of its trading partners. Facing a trade-off between the economic losses from trade diversion and the political gains from stabilizing the regime, it is in China's interest that trade ties are restored as quickly as possible to reduce the losses that arise from the political bias in its importing decisions. In particular, it seems reasonable to believe that China cannot afford to substitute more differentiated goods from a Dalai Lama-receiving country in the long run. At the same time, the partner economies are also interested in a restoration of trade ties with China and are likely to direct diplomatic efforts towards restoring these bilateral relations. If purchases were only postponed as a signal of temporary Chinese discontent after a Dalai Lama meeting, there might even occur a positive 'Dalai Lama Effect' after a while as Chinese imports rebound from past cutbacks.
4.
Empirical Analysis
Data and Method
We estimate econometrically whether and to what extent the diplomatic tensions caused by official receptions of the Dalai Lama impact negatively on the volume of exports to China.
Our econometric model builds on the gravity equation of international trade, the workhorse of statistical analyses of trade flows, which translates Newton's 'Law of Universal Gravitation' to economics. The gravity model assumes that bilateral trade is proportional to the product of the trading partners' economic masses, proxied by GDP, and inversely proportional to the geographic distance between them. In order to control for country heterogeneity, we make use of partner country fixed effects. The effect of bilateral distance and other time-invariant factors, such as being landlocked or contiguous, is thus captured by the partner country fixed effects. In addition to partner country GDP, we add population size and the bilateral exchange rate to our specification, two frequently used variables in the gravity framework.
Moreover, we control for time-specific factors by including dummy variables for each time period. We run the following econometric model:
where is the log of exports of partner country to China at time in current US dollars; is the log of the partner country's gross domestic product in current US dollars;
is the log of the partner country's population size; ℎ is a nominal exchange rate index of the partner country's local currency unit in Yuan; and are time and country fixed effects; and is a stochastic error. Trade data is obtained from the United Nations COMTRADE database. Table A2 lists all the variables employed in the analysis along with their definitions and sources. Table A3 provides descriptive statistics on all variables. Finally, Table A4 lists all countries included in the analysis.
We employ a common AR(1) term as an estimation with a panel-specific AR(1) term would lead to biased results. As noted by Beck and Katz (1995) , in contrast to a panel-specific AR(1) term, the use of the FGLS correction for a common AR(1) is unlikely to lead to inaccurate estimations of the standard errors. There is an emerging literature on biased estimates caused by the prevalence of zero trade flows in gravity models. In our sample, however, this issue seems to be negligible since the number of zero export flows is very small in our sample (57 of 2,269 observations). period. The expected impact on trade is significant at the five percent level and, with 5.7%, considerably smaller than the effect estimated under Fixed Effects. In addition, the FGLS results unveil a negative effect for the first sub-period as well as for the overall sample.
Main results
Closer investigation, however, reveals that this finding is driven by SITC product group 9, a rather heterogeneous group of products.
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In five of the six models in Table 1 Next, we include three additional control variables to our baseline regression to further test the robustness of our results. In a first step, we assess the effect of partner countries' export orientation on exports to China. While time-invariant country characteristics are captured by the country fixed effects, changes in export orientation across time are not accounted for in our baseline model. We hypothesize that exports to China grow over time when a partner 39 We ran the same regression with product subgroups and found results in the first period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) to be driven by exports from SITC group 9 ('Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC'). The negative significant effect of Dalai Lama meetings on exports vanishes when we exclude this group from the regression (Results available on request). SITC product group 9 consists of 'Postal packages not classified according to kind', 'Special transactions and commodities not classified according to kind', 'Coin (other than gold coin), not being legal tender', and 'Gold, non-monetary (excluding gold ores and concentrates)'.
country's export orientation increases. The export orientation of China's trading partners is measured as the total exports to all countries except China as a share of GDP. Trade data is again retrieved from UN COMTRADE and GDP data is obtained from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2009). The effect of export orientation is found to be insignificant in the Fixed Effects regression (column 3). However, in the FGLS estimation, the coefficient is significant at the one percent level and correctly signed (column 8). The coefficient on our Dalai Lama variable is stable and remains significant at conventional levels.
As a second control variable, we add the log of the trade-weighted bilateral tariff rate to our baseline model in order to account for tariff barriers to trade between each country and China.
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The third additional control variable aims to account for the effect of political friendship or hostility on trade with China. A frequently used measure for the extent of bilateral friendship is the degree to which countries vote in line with each other in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (e.g., Richardson and Kegley 1980 , Barro and Lee 2005 , Dreher and Jensen 2007 , Kastner 2007 , Dreher and Gassebner 2008 . The measure, though it has its drawbacks, also has the advantage that it is available for virtually every country in the world over a long time period. We construct a variable for capturing the voting coincidence at the assembly using the same method as Richardson and Kegley (1980) and Thacker (1999) .
Tariff data is taken from the UNCTAD-TRAINS database. In both regression frameworks, the coefficient on the dummy variable for the reception of the Dalai Lama by a government member is robust to the inclusion of tariff rates. While the tariff coefficient is found to be negative, as is in line with theory, it is only significant in the FGLS estimation.
The addition of tariff rates slightly increases the absolute size of the coefficient on the Dalai
Lama variable in the FGLS framework (column 9) and leaves the coefficient in the Fixed
Effects setting virtually unchanged (column 4). In both cases, the coefficient remains significant at the five percent level. This finding can be taken as an indication that the tradereducing 'Dalai Lama Effect' does not operate via an increase of tariff barriers.
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40 Arguably, China's import tariffs themselves may be affected by diplomatic tensions caused by meetings of foreign officials with the Tibetan leader. Hence, the estimated coefficient on the Dalai Lama variable has to be attributed to other channels than the bilateral tariff rate.
Therefore, our indicator of friendship with China is the number of times that a trading partner had the same voting behavior as China as a fraction of all voting instances. Votes in agreement are coded as 1, votes in disagreement as 0 and abstentions and absences as 0.5. The regressions in columns 5 and 10 in Table 1 .2 show that greater amity with China seems to promote trade, but that the effect is only statistically significant in the FGLS regression and has a negligible impact on the size of the Dalai Lama dummy variable.
In order to test Hypothesis 2, we run a modified version of the basic regression for the relevant time period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) , accounting for the different ranks of dignitaries met by the Dalai Lama. To this end, we include four dummy variables with increasingly broader definitions of dignitaries met. Furthermore, we include a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if the Dalai Lama travelled to the country -regardless of whether he was received by any dignitary. All dummy variables take a value of 1 if an event was registered in the current or previous year.
The regressions in columns 1 to 5 (Fixed Effects) and 10 to 14 (FGLS) in Table 2 Having shown that the trade-deteriorating effect is driven by meetings with heads of state or government, we focus on these meetings in the following regression analyses. Table 3 shows how the 'Dalai Lama Effect' evolves over time in a Fixed Effects and in an FGLS
The coefficient on the dummy indicating the presence of the Dalai Lama in the country -irrespective of whether he was received by a dignitary -is statistically not significant at conventional levels in the Fixed Effects (column 5) and loses its significance in the FGLS regression when controlling whether an encounter with the Tibetan leader took place (column 18). This underlines that the effect is only caused by a meeting with a foreign leader whereas the mere presence of the Dalai Lama has no effect.
42 When restricting our sample to European countries, a similar pattern emerges. Once more, we find the largest effect for Dalai Lama meetings with political leaders. Again, the coefficients for Dalai Lama meetings with lowerranked dignitaries are substantially smaller. In the Fixed Effects regression, however, the size of the coefficient for a Dalai Lama meeting with any dignitary outperforms the size of the corresponding dummy restricted to government members or national officials. 
Endogeneity concerns
In analogy to the reverse causal relationship between trade and military conflicts (e.g., Glick
and Taylor 2005), the precise nature of the causal link between diplomatic conflicts and trade is unclear. On the one hand, we hypothesize that receiving the Dalai Lama leads to reduced exports to China. On the other hand, stronger commercial ties might also make it less likely that a political leader invites the Tibetan head of government-in-exile in the first place. There are good reasons to believe that a country is more reluctant to receive the Buddhist leader if it has a well-established trade relationship with China, which it does not want to jeopardize.
In addition to this reverse causality problem, third variables might be omitted that impact on both Dalai Lama meetings and exports to China.
We employ a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) model to account for the potential endogeneity of Dalai Lama meetings. The crucial point in a 2SLS regression framework is the choice of an appropriate instrument, which explains sufficiently well Dalai Lama meetings with political leaders, but is uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage regression.
According to the exclusion restriction, an appropriate instrument should not affect exports to China through channels other than the potentially endogenous variable, i.e., the dummy for Dalai Lama receptions. In other words, an appropriate instrument should have no direct influence on exports to China. In order to find suitable instruments, one needs to get a better understanding of the Dalai Lama's travel behavior. According to the Dalai Lama himself, most visits abroad follow from invitations from Tibetan and Buddhist communities (Gyatso 1990 ). During his stays abroad, the Dalai Lama gives lectures and religious speeches and meets local Buddhist communities. While most meetings with lower-ranked dignitaries are scheduled long in advance, it is usually unclear some weeks or even days before the Dalai Lama embarks on a journey, whether he will be received by high-ranked officials. 43 We employ the following three instruments in an attempt to control for endogeneity: The first instrument is the binary dummy variable discussed above, which takes a value of 1 if the Dalai Lama travelled to a partner country in a given year. The underlying idea is that the Table 2 , which shows that Dalai Lama travels do not have a statistically significant direct effect on exports to China. Our second instrument is the number of days that the Dalai Lama spent in a partner country. We hypothesize that the longer the duration of the Dalai Lama's stay in a country, the greater will be the public awareness of his presence in the country, the more intense will be the public discussion regarding his potential official reception, and the greater will be the pressure on political leaders to receive him.
In some cases, the head of state or government just "drops in" while the Dalai Lama is being received by a lower-ranked government member. The political leader's decision process of whether to receive the Dalai Lama or not is usually accompanied by discussions in the media and demands from pro-Tibet lobby groups.
As a third instrument, we use the number of Tibet Support Groups ( We construct a time series by collecting information on the year of foundation of each TSG to account for the evolution of the pro-Tibet movement over time. In order to get information for those TSGs that do not provide this information on their homepage, we conducted a survey via e-mail and fax. Using this approach, we obtained information on the founding year for about 53.8% of all listed 295
organizations. Unfortunately, insufficient information is available on the number of members of each group so that we cannot account for differences in size between Tibet NGOs. With 31 recorded organizations, most TSGs in our sample are located in France, followed by the United States with 20 Tibet NGOs.
The regressions in columns 1 to 5 of Table 4 show the results for the second stage regressions of our 2SLS approach.
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In order to shed light on the timing of the 'Dalai Lama Effect', we include two dummy variables, the first taking a value of 1 if a Dalai Lama meeting took place in the current period and the second taking a value of 1 if the Dalai Lama was received in the previous period.
The results in column 3 of Table 4 show that the coefficients for both dummy variables have the expected negative signs and are significant at the ten percent level. Tests for overidentification (Hansen J) and tests for underidentification (Kleinbergen Paap LM test)
Again, we present results for the relevant time period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . Starting with the worldwide sample (column 1), the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating whether the Dalai Lama was received by a head of state or head of government in the current or previous year is negative and statistically significant, i.e., we still find that Dalai Lama meetings have a trade-deteriorating effect when controlling for potential endogeneity. The coefficient is somewhat larger than in the Fixed Effects regression (Table   1 .2, column 1). For the European subsample, displayed in column 2 of Table 4 , the Dalai Lama coefficient is significant at the five percent level and again is larger than in the Fixed Effects regression (Table 1 .2, column 2).
44 www.tibet.net 45 All results are based on the user-written Stata command xtivreg2 (Schaffer 2005) .
also confirm the validity of our instruments. Even though the 2SLS regression results support our previous findings, note that the C test for endogeneity does not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the Dalai Lama dummy.
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Next, we tackle a further endogeneity issue, which stems from the potential endogeneity of lagged export values in an extended model. Since trade relationships are persistent over time, we include lagged exports as an additional explanatory variable in order to explain current exports to China as a function of past export values. Established commercial ties and signed contracts mean that exports evolve with inertia. It is possible that the lagged exports variable is endogenous in a short panel, which could lead to biased results (Nickell 1981) .
Unobserved panel level effects may be correlated with lagged exports, thereby making the 2SLS estimator inconsistent. In order to address this issue, we apply the two-step System GMM estimator, which incorporates equations in first differences and in levels (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998) . Since we have a small T in our setting (T=7), we employ the Windmeijer correction to obtain corrected standard errors, which are larger and much more reliable in finite samples (Windmeijer 2005) . Meetings with the Dalai Lama are treated as endogenous and all additional covariates as strictly exogenous. Furthermore, we include time fixed effects and employ the same external instruments as in the 2SLS regression framework discussed above. To limit the number of instruments, the matrix of instruments is collapsed as proposed in Roodman (2009) .
Consequently, the Fixed Effects estimates discussed in Section 4.2 are more efficient than the 2SLS estimates.
Before proceeding to the GMM estimations, column 4 of Table 4 reports for comparison the 2SLS results when lagged exports are included as an additional control variable. The coefficient on lagged exports to China is statistically significant at the five percent level.
Interestingly, the Dalai Lama dummy indicating a meeting with a political leader in the previous period becomes insignificant once we include the lagged exports variable. Arguably, the 'Dalai Lama Effect' of meetings in the previous period is already (partially) captured in the lagged export variable. However, the dummy variable indicating a reception of the Tibetan leader in the current period remains statistically significant at conventional levels as expected. In column 5, we therefore exclude the dummy variable indicating a Dalai Lama meeting in the previous period. The coefficients on the remaining variables remain virtually unchanged. 46 Under conditional homoskedasticity, the C statistic is numerically equal to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. However, its main advantage is that it is robust to violations of conditional homoskedasticity (see Hayashi 2000, pp. 232-234) .
Column 6 shows our GMM regression results for the worldwide sample. 47 The estimated coefficient on Dalai Lama meetings is negative, statistically significant at the five percent level, and of similar size as the corresponding value in the 2SLS setting. The coefficient on the lagged exports variable has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the five percent level. The Hansen test on the validity of the instruments used does not reject the exogeneity of the covariates. The Arellano-Bond test rejects the hypothesis of second order autocorrelation in the data, which needs to be absent in order for the estimator to be consistent. As a final robustness check, we exclude France in column 7 and India in column 8 from our sample, since both countries show extreme values in the distribution of our instrumental variables. France is by far the country with the most Tibet Support Groups (31 in our sample). India, in turn, is the country that experiences the longest Dalai Lama visits (up to 124 days per year). Nevertheless, when separately excluding the two countries from the GMM regression, our variable of interest remains statistically significant at the five percent level (columns 7 and 8). We therefore conclude that our results are not driven by these outliers.
Results by product group
Finally, we investigate, which product groups drive the trade-deteriorating 'Dalai Lama Effect'. As indicated in the first column of Table 5 .1, the value of exports to China is especially concentrated among the following SITC product groups: 'Machinery and transport equipment' (41.0% of total exports to China), 'Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material' (13.3%), 'Chemicals and related products' (12.4%) and 'Crude materials, inedible, except fuels' (12.1%). Exports of goods of the most important product group, 'Machinery and transport equipment', are expected to be closely associated with the state of political relations between countries as negotiations over the purchase of such goods are commonly carried out during the course of high-rank trade talks between national representatives and trade delegations. Running separate regressions for each SITC product group, Table 5.1 reports the full-sample results for the period 2002 to 2008. With the exception of 'Beverages and tobacco', the coefficients for all subgroups exhibit the expected negative sign in the Fixed Effects and FGLS regressions. However, only SITC group 7, which incorporates 'Machinery and transport equipment', the most important product group, turns out to be statistically significant in both regression frameworks. In the FGLS setting, we furthermore find a statistically significant and negative coefficient for 'Food, live animals', 'Crude materials' and 'Mineral fuels'. 47 All results are based on the user-written Stata command xtabond2 (Roodman 2009 Finally, there is at least some evidence that strategic goods such as 'Crude materials' and 'Mineral fuels' are not free from political influences. This contradicts Polachek (1980) , who argues that oil exports show a low export elasticity to conflict between trading partners, as oil-dependent economies have little choice but to continue importing the product regardless of any bilateral conflicts with an oil-exporting country.
Conclusion
The Such a strategy may reduce China's scope to play one trading partner off against another.
Nonetheless, with the increasing economic power of China and other emerging countries, the (ab)use of trade ties as a foreign policy tool is likely to gain in importance. 
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